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BOOK REVIEWS

Evolution and Criticism
Judy Halden-Sullivan, Book Review Editor

“H

ow close can we get to the origins of art in our own species?” Author Brian
Boyd poses this ambitious question to focus his wide-ranging study, On the
Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction, a text reviewed in this issue (6). For
millennia, humans have distinguished themselves by creating, enjoying, and debating art,
but why do we do it? Why art? The books reviewed in this issue offer compelling speculation in regard to this query, and while scientific, psychological, and often Darwinian, each
author’s response promises expanded perspectives on what it means to be human.
Julie Nichols, a professor of English who teaches genre studies, provides a double
review that marries kindred analyses: Boyd’s aforementioned On the Origin of Stories
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 2009) and Lisa Zunshine’s Why We Read
Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel (Columbus: Ohio State UP, 2006). In his elaborate 540-page exploration, Boyd characterizes art as not simply a by-product of evolution but a trigger for human development: a survival-adaptive function that deepens our
cognitive abilities, our mental flexibility. Boyd supports his thesis with findings from
diverse evolutionary theorists, and when arguing for the innate necessity of humans’
drive to compose and share narratives, he also draws upon evidence provided by cognitive sciences—in particular, from the field called “Theory of Mind.”
“A cluster of cognitive adaptations that allows us to navigate our social world and
also structures that world”: that is how Lisa Zunshine defines Theory of Mind in her
study, Why We Read Fiction, and it is ToM (as it is termed) that grounds her examination of fiction as a humanizing evolutionary process that bestows upon readers keener
social awareness. In turn, in reviewing Zunshine’s work, Nichols posits “evocriticism”
as a provocative approach to understanding story-making: applying paradigms afforded
by cognitive sciences to analyze narrative texts as material demonstrations of evolutionary principles.
In a similar vein, Denis Dutton applies evocriticism to the world of art in his book,
The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure, and Human Evolution (NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2009).
Mary Pettice, a professor of English studies with a specialization in contemporary
media, critiques Dutton’s argument that art, in all its diverse forms, confers survival and
even reproductive advantages upon the humans who produce it. As Pettice notes, Dutton, for better or worse, does not hesitate to judge art from around the globe in terms of
his evolutionary perspective.
Evocritics like Boyd, Zunshine, and Dutton amply attest to the primal survivaladaptive function of art, revealing that art is not only entertainment, dazzling craft, or
moral insight. Art is a catalyst for our species: our commitment to dialogue with even
the most intractable texts transforms us, making us more intensely, mindfully human.
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T

hose who belong to an organization called “Assembly for Expanded Perspectives
on Learning” may be an audience quick to embrace the notion of story-making
as a profoundly human activity. Telling stories—true, false, or invented—identifies us as
beings with consciousness and conscience, beings who seek not only factual knowledge
but also connectedness with others like (and unlike) ourselves. When I recently taught a
“Literary Genres” class on fiction, my undergraduate students predictably answered firstday questions—“What is fiction? What is its function in human consciousness?”—by
pointing to fiction’s entertainment value. “It’s always been my escape,” they said in so
many words. But, by the end of the semester, they were dancing a far more complex step:
fiction co-creates reality, they asserted. In a world where binaries of truth/falsity, reality/
fantasy, self/Others are felt to be rigid, fiction allows for the creation of a third thing, as
Lewis Hyde argues in his study of myth and art, Trickster Makes This World: fiction is a
third space richly dependent upon the transformative experiences of readers. As Nabokov
points out, the reading of fiction expands emotional and mental awareness, brings into
our consciousness types of people and experiences we may not have sought out before,
and provides knowledge of being otherwise impossible to gain firsthand. As William Gass
argues, such awareness is made possible on the level of the sentence, in the individual
work, and within the subcategories of the genre. As those nourished by fiction, we award
a plethora of prizes for it because it is essential to our growth and learning. We strive to
perpetuate it, to encourage its ever higher quality. Fiction is in us. It is natural, inevitable,
and even indispensable to the human race.
All well and good, if a little romanticized for these postmodern times, when theory
has made contested sites of the author, the subject, and the text as artifact. But for that
very reason, my students were assigned to conclude their semester with readings from
two books I will now consider: Brian Boyd’s On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction and Lisa Zunshine’s Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the
Novel. The cumulative effect of these books might be visualized as the intersecting arcs
of a Venn diagram made up of three—perhaps surprising—circles, one labeled “Darwinian evolution,” another “cognitive science,” and a third simply, “literary theory.” For
reasons I hope to demonstrate here, my students’ sense of the role of fiction in human
affairs was stretched and augmented by these final readings, which marry current neuroscientific findings about how the mind works with enlightening analyses of specific
texts—their production, as well as their effects on those who read them. As writers and
readers of fiction themselves, curious about the production as well as the impact of storymaking, my students discovered much to ponder. Although our class did not unequivocally agree with either Boyd or Zunshine, we found them refreshing in their attempts to
move from abstract postmodernism to practical, material methods of a “scientific” literary criticism. These volumes separately, but even more when read together, reward the
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reader with both the immediate pleasure of logical and stylistic clarity and the long-term
gratification of useful new ideas regarding the function of fiction in human culture.
Boyd begins by analyzing our longevity as a species, focusing upon the human
qualities and behaviors that have guaranteed our survival. He wants to examine art and
play. Both have essential adaptive survival functions, which is why they can be found
in every human culture from the beginning of our time on earth. By the end of this
540-page volume (notes arrive on p. 417), the words “adaptation” and “survival” begin
to constitute almost a mantra, a good-natured rhythmic repetition, as Boyd insists that,
since fiction is “the one human art with no known precedent” (2, emphasis mine), the
biocultural perspective—the one that acknowledges the survival-adaptive function of all
human behaviors—is the only one that will allow us to “appreciate how deeply surprising fiction is, and how deeply natural” (3).
Boyd’s aim is to “offer an account of fiction . . . that takes in our widest context for
explaining life, evolution” (11). For those who may accept alternative “widest contexts
for explaining life,” the adherence to Darwinian material evolution has shortcomings.
For example, Owen Barfield, whose work I reviewed in the 2009 issue of JAEPL, sees
evolution as a process that includes consciousness and karma—not a solely material
process at all. Nevertheless, Boyd’s two-part argument engages the reader with its clarity and erudite logic. Book One lays out the premises by which art and fiction can be
considered biological adaptations, defining “art” and “adaption” with precision by citing
numerous theorists, from Darwin through von Frisch (on honeybees and their dance),
to Dawkins (on the improbability of performing complex activity for no reason), Cosmides, Tooby, and Geary (on evolutionary psychology), and many others.
“An evolutionary adaptation,” Boyd summarizes, “is a feature of body, mind, or
behavior that exists throughout a species and shows evidence of good design for a specific function or functions that will ultimately make a difference to the species’ survival
and reproductive success” (80; italics Boyd’s). He takes on Stephen Pinker, “the foremost
critic of claims that art is an adaptation,” pointing out that “the compulsion to engage in
art needs to explain the compulsion to make art as well as to enjoy it” (82; italics Boyd’s).
Pinker’s notion that art is a byproduct of evolution makes no sense to Boyd. Making art
is so energy- and time-intensive in comparison to its apparent immediate benefits that
we would give it up—it would die out quickly—if it had no survival-adaptive function
to compel us toward it.
Art, Boyd posits, is an adaptive behavior—a “kind of cognitive play, the set of activities designed to engage human attention through their appeal to our preference for inferentially rich and . . . patterned information” (85; italics Boyd’s). His italicized words are
key. Attention ensures survival. The individual to whom attention is paid is more likely
to survive. Attention to patterns, and to their variations, helps ensure the survival of
the individual and the community in which those patterns appear. Boyd explains that,
The high concentrations of patterns that art delivers repeatedly engage and activate individual
brains and over time alter their wiring to modify key human perceptual, cognitive, and
expressive systems, especially in terms of sight, hearing, movement, and social cognition.
All of art’s other functions lead from this . . . Art becomes a social and individual system
for engendering creativity, for producing options not confined by the here and now or the
immediate and given. All other functions lead up to this. (86-87; italics Boyd’s)
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Art and play give humans opportunities to attend to patterns—either pre-existing
ones or ones newly created by the play itself—without competitive or punitive consequences. The result is a more flexible mind, a wider-ranging intelligence, infinitely
expandable brainpower: “By refining and strengthening our sociality, by making us
readier to use the resources of the imagination, and by raising our confidence in shaping
life on our own terms, art fundamentally alters our relation to our world . . . . By focusing our attention away from the given to a world of shared, humanly created possibility,
art makes all the difference” (125).
Boyd then moves from a discussion of art in general to a discussion of story-making—fiction-making—as art, with a survival function equal to that of any art and
unique to humans, with their capacity for language. Boyd begins Part Three of Book
One by distinguishing between narrative and fiction, pointing out that we are not
taught narrative. The drive and the ability to understand events in chronological and
spatial order are built into us. If we cannot do so, we do not survive. Memory and prediction are fundamentally survival adaptations, and narrative develops both. It is in this
section that Boyd discusses Theory of Mind (141-152), the idea from cognitive science
which is Lisa Zunshine’s focus.
Like Boyd, to whom I will return shortly, Zunshine is eminently readable, personal
in style (much more so than Boyd, actually, with frequent asides and appeals to the
reader), logical, engaging in tone, and continuously thought-provoking in the development of her argument. Like Boyd, Zunshine cleaves to current scientific theories regarding the development of the human mind; like him, she cites numerous studies and the
theorists who conducted them in their quest to understand how the mind works. Her
considerably shorter but no less scholarly book (198 pages; notes begin on p. 165) defines
Theory of Mind (ToM)—also known as “mind-reading”—as “a cluster of cognitive
adaptations that allows us to navigate our social world and also structures that world”
(162). Pointing to autism as a deficiency or lack of ToM, and to the inability in schizophrenics to attribute correctly the sources of the voices they hear, Zunshine analyzes the
differences between “normal” people and those who cannot competently perform three
processes that she defines in detail:
• “source-monitor” (47), in other words, identify who said what about whom and
how that should be interpreted, explored in Part Two, “Tracking Minds”
• navigate the layers of thinking about others thinking about themselves or about
yet others, demonstrated in Part Three, “Concealing Minds”
• interweave cognitive and emotional responses, elaborated upon in Part Three and
in the conclusion, “Why Do We Read (and Write) Fiction?”
Finally, Zunshine asserts that meta-representation—the ability to keep track of what
is being presented as true and by whom—is a crucial skill for effective living in the
world. That is, it is an adaptation with survival functions. It is also a requisite skill for
interpreting, understanding, and enjoying fiction. Zunshine’s thesis is, on the surface,
more about reading than about evolutionary survival. But her argument is that the skills
which good fiction reading requires make readers more “human,” more capable of “making it” in human situations. “Intensely social species that we are,” she says, “we . . . read
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fiction because it engages [and exercises], in a variety of particularly focused ways, our
Theory of Mind” (162). When taken together, Zunshine’s book illuminates and expands
upon Boyd’s. Boyd’s, in turn, constructs a broader foundation for the kind of thinking
Zunshine’s work demonstrates. Zunshine applies cognitive science to the service of better reading of texts. Boyd employs texts to illuminate his theory about the evolutionary
survival-adaptive functions of art.
Indeed, much of the pleasure to be derived from reading Boyd’s and Zunshine’s
books comes from the depth and originality of the case studies each recruits to illustrate
his or her thesis. In Book Two of Origin, Boyd introduces “evocriticism” by investigating the Odyssey’s origins in oral storytelling and the apparent conscious creative effort
summoned to commit the work to writing, as the bard sought “strategically to solve . .
. particular problems, immediate and longer-term” (218), having to do with garnering
the attention of his audience. According to Boyd, one way he did this was by beginning
the epic with an encapsulation of the story to come, putting it in a context of community—quoting Homer’s appeal to his audience that, “‘if you are Greek, this concerns
you’” (as qtd. in Boyd 220).
But more than that, Homer made use of patterns of character and event in new
ways guaranteed to keep his audience’s attention. Boyd reminds us that “storytelling
can command the attention of others by delivering high-intensity social information”
(222). Such information includes images of personalities and accounts of behaviors of
highly influential people like Odysseus. Patterns of events which Aristotle approvingly
termed “unity of action”—in which every episode fits and none is irrelevant—also constitute high-intensity social information. Recalling his key terms “attention” and “pattern,” Boyd’s detailed reading of the Odyssey stresses Homer’s attention-getting choices
in constructing a main character who embodies both an ultimate human being and
the impulse to return home. The latter desire, based in the evolutionarily significant
biological bond between parent and child and the equally adaptive cultural institution
of the family, is hampered by an increasingly difficult set of obstacles. Odysseus overcomes these material and psychological obstacles in “a series of changes in perspective,
pace, and tactics” (228)—in other words, through an evolution in his own intelligence,
discernible to his audience as possibilities for their own transformation. Incidentally, in
Trickster Makes This World, Lewis Hyde reads Odysseus as the first modern consciousness: a trickster who lies to get what he wants.
Throughout his explication, Boyd theorizes that, as an author, Homer was a strategist vying for his audience’s attention in order to “maximize the benefits [he] could earn
against the compositional costs [he] had to be prepared to pay” (253). This emphasis also drives his discussion of—surprisingly—Dr. Seuss’s Horton Hears a Who! The
contrast in texts is deliberately chosen. In his analysis of the 1954 picture book, Boyd
emphasizes the fiction-maker as individual. For instance, little is known about Homer,
so that readers of the Odyssey must make assumptions about audience expectations, literary traditions, and cultural norms. But in the case of Horton Hears a Who!, Boyd gives us
Theodor Geisel’s detailed personal history to illustrate the “play” and “attention-getting”
choices he made as Dr. Seuss, from the repetitive lines and curves in his drawings to the
rhymes and polarities in his narratives.
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In both cases, the texts are illuminated by Boyd’s insistence that art has evolutionary
benefits both for the artist (the fiction-maker) and the audience: the survival of both is
ensured by the best works of art. I might add that art itself co-evolves with its makers
and audiences. Boyd’s choice of texts, one ancient, one nearly contemporary, illustrates
that evolution.
Zunshine’s examples spotlight the ways in which fiction requires readers to exercise
their survival-ensuring skills of meta-representation and mind-reading. She points to the
convoluted revelations of character in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway; the self-deception of Katerina Ivanovna in Crime and Punishment; and the problem of self-represented
“truth” in novels such as Don Quixote and Robinson Crusoe. She analyzes the ways in
which the unreliable narrator of Nabokov’s Lolita attributes states of mind to others
in the novel which the skillful reader learns to distrust, understanding this distrust as
part of the “lesson” of the fiction. Zunshine examines the role of meta-representation
in effectively reading detective novels by Dorothy Sayers, Maurice LeBlanc, and Jane
Austen, asserting at one point that, “[Emma] has been described as ‘the most fiendishly
difficult of detective stories’” (Sayers 31, qtd. in Zunshine 129). Like Boyd, Zunshine
shows that fictional texts reflect and demand the complex workings of the human brain
as it strives to maintain and also expand its own infinite possibilities.
Whether or not readers of these two books are convinced at the beginning that a
Darwinian or cognitive-scientific approach to literature will prove to be more helpful
than any other, by the end, they will certainly experience the benefits of having paid
attention. Even if doubt remains whether the biocultural perspective is the only one that
will allow us to “appreciate how deeply surprising fiction is, and how deeply natural”
(3), Boyd and Zunshine’s studies still reveal the distinctly human nature of story-telling
and fiction-making, astutely raising awareness of the complexity of these behaviors, and
their dynamic, vital role in our species’ evolution.
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D

enis Dutton’s The Art Instinct purports to offer an argument for the development
of the arts in early human evolution, but in the end, he relegates evolutionary
science to a supportive role for his critique of modernist aesthetics and the last 100 years of
artistic production. Dutton, who died in 2010, was the creator of the online Arts & Letters
Daily, a thoughtful clearinghouse for scholarly writing online, some of it interdisciplinary. And so, Dutton admirably embraces the spirit of interdisciplinary exploration while
building his argument, turning to his own discipline of philosophy and art—and also to
evolutionary science, psychology, linguistics, and sociobiology. His overarching distaste
for modernism does not diminish his main argument, but unnecessarily distracts us from
an idea that is ultimately persuasive and quite fascinating.
This ambitious text opens up valuable and interesting lines of thought about how
“the art instinct”—as Dutton terms it—came to exist within humankind. At its simplest, his thesis argues that humans universally feel moved to create and enjoy art of all
kinds because these drives are hard-wired into our genes. He argues that this particular
drive emerged as an adaptation during the same time our prehistoric ancestors acquired
the species’ basic skills, social systems, and emotional and intellectual traits. His most
persuasive argument comes early in the book, when he painstakingly stitches together
evidence for his claim that the African savanna and nearby woodlands represent the
worldwide human preference for “the blue, watery landscape,” an image that, he argues,
offers prehistoric assurances of high-protein hunting grounds and the promise of security and refuge (18).
One of the more innocent and, indeed, necessary assertions in support of his argument that this particular landscape is favored across cultures is: “This fundamental
attraction to certain types of landscapes is not socially constructed but is present in
human nature as an inheritance from the Pleistocene, the 1.6 million years during which
modern human beings evolved” (18). Dutton’s main thesis rests on two basic arguments:
first, that the art instinct is universal in the species, and, second, that it developed not
as a byproduct of other, more central adaptations to the genome through the evolutionary process, but as an adaptation itself, one that conferred survival and reproductive
advantages upon those whose genomes first expressed the inclination. These claims may
seem obvious to anyone who agrees unhesitatingly that the arts are integral to human
experiences. However, the philosophical implications of the former assertion can be
problematic.
In developing his argument that human universals exist in the first place, Dutton
returns again and again to a criticism of those who, in contemporary anthropology, ethnology, and art history, suggest that many observable human behaviors are not based
on biological preferences but social constructions. Indeed, he rejects the arguments of
those who would caution us to resist applying our Western standards to analyses of nonWestern art—and turns the tables on them, accusing them of “exoticizing foreign cultures and denying the universality of art” (4). In his chapter, “But They Don’t Have Our
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Concept of Art,” he claims that, while no anthropologist says so openly, many imply
that “since the meaning of any concept is constituted by the other concepts and cultural forms in which it is embedded, concepts can never be intelligibly compared crossculturally” (74). And, using the statement that he has not been able to attribute to any
anthropologist, Dutton rejects the caveats made by those who cautiously suggest that
thinkers are wrong to apply Western concepts of art and other human endeavors to nonWestern societies and cultures. Nonsense, he says; understanding other cultures’ artistic
expressions “is hardly an insurmountable task for the Western intellectual imagination”
(75). What follows that assertion is inevitable: he claims that if we cannot say another
culture’s artifact production is art in a Western sense, then it isn’t art at all (76).
To be fair, Dutton uses a wide-ranging definition of art to justify this dismissal,
saying that authentic art is expressed in the “great traditions of Asia and the rest of the
world, including tribal cultures of Africa, the Americas, and Oceania” (76). But the
overall message of the chapter affirms the centrality of a Western concept of art and
further embraces what one might see as a narrow preference for one kind of Western
aesthetic.
The African savanna as an enduring image for the book’s theme is, unfortunately,
rivaled by the author’s insistence on returning again and again to the problem he sees
posed by Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain, the urinal offered—and rejected—as an object
d’art in a 1917 exhibition. Dutton’s entire thesis rests on a universal definition of art and
set of aesthetics that he discusses with persuasive detail. However, the existence of the
last 100 years of art, primarily the modernist movement, often complicates Dutton’s
definition of art. Indeed, he dismisses much of 20th century Western art, asserting that,
“A determination to shock and puzzle has sent much recent art down a wrong path”
(11). Dutton most certainly is permitted to embrace a particular aesthetic, one that some
will not find agreeable. However, whether fueled by a personal distaste or a logical need
to identify the modernist movement as an evolutionary dead-end, as it were, his attacks
on both the philosophical underpinnings of the movement and individual works of art
themselves lead us far, far away from the book’s promising and intriguing thesis.
Logically, however, his attacks on modernism cannot be said to be entirely off topic.
He claims he hopes, through his analysis, that “Darwinist aesthetics can restore the vital
place of beauty, skill, and pleasure as high artistic values” (11-12). The promising, even
exciting hypothesis of the book—that one might be able to gather enough evidence to
suggest that the drive to enjoy and create art is an evolutionary adaptation—seems much
more monumental than the mere employment of Dutton’s thesis in a scheme to reclaim
what the author sees as the real purpose and expression of high art.
Therefore, the most rewarding discussions Dutton offers are those that return to the
enticing ideas expressed by his thesis. Art, he argues, is not simply a by-product of a species that found itself with discerning eyes and ears, capable hands and voices, and, once
having met their immediate survival needs like food and shelter, then turned to art as
entertainment. Instead, Dutton roots art’s primacy in the work of evolutionary biologists who point to several fitness indicators that are positively correlated with health and
reproductive potential: facial symmetry, clear skin, an hourglass figure in women, and
the appearance of upper-body strength in males. The ability to create art that pleases
others is, he asserts, like language in that it serves as an evolutionary fitness indicator
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and is indeed integral to survival and to sexual selection. Dutton claims that the abilities
to think like an artist or be an appreciative member of an artist’s audience denote both
intelligence and an ability to relate to other human beings.
In addition, Dutton argues, the luxury of having time to create art also indicates to
a potential mate a special kind of surplus: that a fit individual is doing more than just
surviving. Dutton draws on the work of economist Thorstein Veblen, the inventor of the
phrase “conspicuous consumption,” and reinterprets human displays of wealth, arguing that creating or adorning oneself in useless but beautiful art reinforced the message
that the individual, particularly in prehistoric times, could thrive even when engaged
in behaviors not immediately linked to survival. He imagines the cost/benefit implications of the male peacock’s tail and says that, for our ancestors, “The best way for an
individual to demonstrate the possession of an adaptive quality—money, health, imagination, strength, vigor—is to be seen wasting these very resources” (156). To his credit,
Dutton worries about inadvertently suggesting that “costliness and art are intrinsically
connected in our aesthetic psychology,” but the overall argument ably supports his contention that art demonstrates a kind of mental and imaginative fitness (156).
Dutton’s work ultimately argues that art is not only essential to the species but one of
its central attributes. He suggests that human evolution in the wake of our rapid development of large brains needed art as an intellectual coping mechanism as we negotiated
our places in an increasingly social environment. Dutton writes, quoting the sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson, “‘There was not enough time for human heredity to cope with
the vastness of the new contingent possibilities revealed by high intelligence,’ Wilson
says: ‘the arts filled the gap,’ allowing human beings to develop more flexible and sophisticated responses to new situations” (120).
Our ancestors self-selected the art instinct by esteeming those with artistic sensibilities. Our efforts at creating aesthetic schemes by which to judge art happen, Dutton implies, as a byproduct of the centrality of art in our imaginative lives. In such an
environment, then, his own particular aesthetic theories are welcome enough—but
shouldn’t be a distraction from the truly inspired connection he makes between human
genetic history and the development of art.
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